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Abstract
Since the 2005/06 agricultural season, the government 
of Malawi has been implementing a targeted agricultural 
input subsidy programme through the provision of 
fertilizers and maize seeds to smallholder farmers at 
subsidized prices. This paper analyses the factors that 
influence access to agricultural input subsidies in Malawi. 
The results show that vulnerable households such as the 
poor and elderly-headed are less likely to receive fertilizer 
coupons and receive less of the subsidized fertilizers. 
Households with larger parcels of land and those who 
sell part of their produce (commercialized) are more likely 
to receive coupons and also tend to acquire more 
fertilizers. Use of open meetings in the allocation of 
coupons tends to favour the poor and the poor receive 
more fertilizer compared with other alternative ways of 
allocating coupons. We also find a positive relation 
between participation in other social safety nets and 
access to subsidized fertilizer coupons, suggesting that 
households with multiple access to different types of 
social protection programmes are not excluded from the 
input subsidy programme by virtue of benefiting from 
other social protection programmes.
1. Introduction
The agricultural sector in Malawi is dominated by 
smallholder farmers mostly engaged in subsistence 
farming of the main staple crop, maize. Smallholder 
farmers devote almost 70 percent of their land to maize 
cultivation, and maize availability in the country defines 
the food security situation of the country. Smallholder 
agriculture in Malawi has been characterized by low 
productivity, low technology and labour intensity. The 
low productivity in smallholder agriculture has been 
attributed to loss in soil fertility, low application of 
inorganic fertilizers and traditional low technology 
rain-fed farming systems. Most of the smallholder farmers 
are resource-poor and cannot afford to purchase fertilizers 
at prevailing market prices. It is estimated that 52 percent 
of the population in Malawi lives below the poverty line, 
with rural poverty estimated at 55.9 percent (GOM and 
World Bank 2007). Prices of fertilizers have increased 
dramatically in recent years (Dorward et al. 2010), and 
this has created difficulties for rural farmers to acquire 
fertilizers at prevailing market prices. Smallholder 
fertilizer consumption in Malawi is low at about 34 
kilograms per hectare compared to more than 150 
kilograms in the estate sector (GOM and World Bank 
2007).
In order to address some of the problems in agriculture 
and to raise the incomes of the resource poor, the Malawi 
Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme (MAISP) was first 
implemented in the 2005/06 agricultural season following 
a poor harvest season and a high maize import bill to 
augment domestic supply in 2004/05 agricultural season. 
In 2008/09, the MAISP was in its fourth year of 
implementation, with changes in the scale, scope and 
ways of implementation. The MAISP is largely financed 
by the government, with donor support being in form 
of overall budgetary support. The MAISP is designed as 
a targeted input subsidy programme, targeting 
smallholder farmers with land but who cannot afford to 
purchase inputs at market rates. The target is 2.8 million 
farming households identified by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Food Security, out of an estimated 3.4 
farming households. The size of the MAISP has increased 
from 132,000 tonnes in 2005/06 to 216,000 tonnes in 
2007/08. This has also meant that the cost of the subsidy 
has escalated from MK5.1 billion (2.1 percent of GDP) in 
2005/6 to MK16.3 billion (3.4 percent of GDP) in 2007/08 
and to MK31 billion (5.5 percent of GDP) in 2008/09 
(Dorward et al. 2010). The fertilizer subsidy per farmer 
increased from 64 percent to 79 percent of the commercial 
price in 2005/06 and 2007/08, respectively.
Due to the high poverty rate among the rural 
population, agricultural input subsidies apart from being 
an instrument of promoting agricultural growth can also 
be seen as a social protection instrument of ensuring 
access to inputs, and access and availability of food to 
vulnerable groups. Dorward et al. (2006) discuss the 
various strategic ways in which agriculture, agricultural 
policies and social protection programmes address the 
problems of vulnerable groups. Four strategic pathways 
are identified: social protection from agriculture and 
agricultural growth (such as service delivery, input 
subsidies and market intervention); social protection for 
agriculture (insurance, public works through created 
assets, inputs for work); social protection through 
agriculture (targeted inputs programmes); and social 
protection independent of agriculture (conditional or 
unconditional cash transfers, food aid).  One direct way 
in which input subsidies can provide social protection 
to the poor is by targeting the poor or by implementing 
very high subsidies to ensure that the poor are able to 
access such inputs (Dorward et al. 2006). The input 
subsidy programme as a productivity enhancing 
intervention can also provide social protection to the 
poor and vulnerable households.
This paper investigates factors that determine 
household access to subsidized fertilizer coupons and 
how access to subsidy coupons complement other social 
protection programmes that focus on resource poor 
farmers. We test the hypothesis that the fertilizer subsidy 
programme targets the poor and vulnerable households, 
and hence that the programme offers direct social 
protection to such households. The paper is organized 
into five sections. The next section focuses on a brief 
overview of the design of the agricultural input subsidy 
programme focussing primarily on targeting and 
implementation experiences. Section 3 outlines the 
econometric model of determinants of access, definition 
of variables and the data used for the analysis. Section 
4 presents the results of the econometric analysis and 
discussion of the results. Finally, section 5 presents 
concluding remarks.
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2. Coupon Allocation and 
Targeting in the Malawi 
Agricultural Input Subsidy2
 
    The agricultural input subsidy programme aims at 
promoting access and use of fertilizers among smallholder 
farmers in order to increase agricultural productivity and 
food security. According to GOM (2008b) the main 
objective of the agricultural input subsidy programme 
is to achieve household food self-sufficiency and 
increased income through increased food and cash crop 
production. In order to achieve these objectives, the 
target was defined as resource-poor Malawians who own 
a piece of land and are resident in the village, with special 
consideration to guardians looking after physically 
challenged persons and vulnerable groups such as child-
headed, female-headed or orphan-headed households 
and households affected by HIV and AIDS (GOM 2008b). 
Although Dorward et al. (2010) note that the targeting 
criteria have explicitly placed more emphasis on 
vulnerable groups, in practice, there are difficulties in 
the application of these criteria, particularly due to the 
fact that the targeting criteria remained wide and that 
the criteria fitted large numbers of households against 
the available number of coupons allocated for the 
area. 
    The agricultural subsidy programme mainly focuses 
on the subsidization of maize fertilizers and improved 
maize seeds. However, the scope of coverage of crops 
under the subsidy programme had varied over time, and 
in addition to maize included tobacco, tea and coffee 
fertilizers, legume seeds, cotton seeds and chemicals and 
maize storage chemicals. The subsidy comes in various 
packages. Table 1 shows the various packages that have 
been used in various agricultural seasons by type of crops. 
A beneficiary household was entitled to either a maize 
package of fertilizers and seeds, a tobacco package of 
fertilizers, or a cotton package of chemicals and seeds. 
In addition, beneficiaries were also entitled to a flexible 
coupon to enable them purchase legume seeds, maize 
storage chemicals as well as improved maize seeds. In 
the 2008/09 season, due to substantial increases in the 
prices of fertilizers, the fertilizer subsidy also covered 
smallholder tea and coffee farmers3.  Tobacco, tea and 
coffee are the main commercial and export crops in 
Malawi and there are arguments in favour of and against 
subsidizing cash crops. For example, those that argue in 
favour of subsidization of cash crops on one hand 
contend that  subsidizat ion a l lows greater 
commercialisation of smallholder farming, and increased 
incomes from these cash crops can be used to purchase 
food, particularly when the income increases are 
widespread among food insecure households. However, 
most smallholder farmers engaged in cash crops tend 
to be food secure and the benefits to vulnerable groups 
of such a policy are limited. On the other hand, those 
who argue against subsidization of cash crops note that 
subsidization of cash crops has the most displacement 
effects and resources therefore may not lead to 
incremental production necessary to maintain low food 
prices affordable to vulnerable people (SOAS et al. 
2008).
     The agricultural input subsidy as a targeted programme 
has a fixed number of vouchers that have to be distributed 
to smallholder farmers across the country. In the 2008/09 
season, the subsidy was expected to benefit 1.5 million 
farmers for maize fertilizers, 0.2 million farmers for 
tobacco fertilizers, 1.9 million farmers for the maize seed 
subsidy, 0.435 million farmers for the flexible seed subsidy 
and 0.2 million farmers for cotton seed and chemicals. 
The total number of farming households was estimated 
at 3.2 million (GOM 2008a). In the 2008/09 season, there 
were three stages involved the targeting process: 
updating a register of all farm households, allocation of 
coupons to districts and within districts and local (village) 
processes of selecting beneficiaries.
     First, the registration of farmers started in the 2007/08 
season and this register was updated in the 2008/09 
season between May and August 2008. The register 
Table 1 Malawi Agricultural Subsidy Packages 2005/06 – 2008/09
Inputs/Crop Maize Tobacco Cotton
Fertilizer
• 1 bag of 50 kilograms of NPK
• 1 bag of 50 kilograms of 
UREA
• 1 bag 50 kilogram of CAN 
• 1 bag 50 kilogram of D. 
Compound
–
Seeds
• 4.5 kilograms of open polli-
nated varieties (OPV) maize 
seed
• 2 kilograms of hybrid seed a
–
• 5 kilograms of acid delinted 
and treated cotton seed b
Chemicals – –
• 1 bottle of 50 millilitres of aphi-
cide b
• 2 bottles of 200 millilitres of 
larvicide b
Other seeds 
and chemicals
• Bean seed (2 kg) b, groundnuts seed (2 kg) b, soybean seeds (2-3 kg) b and pigeon peas seed (2 
kg) b, 200 grams bottle of maize storage pesticide c.
    Notes: a since 2006/07 season, b since 2007/08 season, c since 2008/09 season
    Source: GOM (2008a; 2008b)
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formed the basis of allocation of coupons to the districts 
and within the villages. Secondly, the allocation to 
districts and within the district is based on maize areas 
cultivated and number of farm households. Prior to 
2007/08 season, there was no registration of farm families 
and local leaders identified households that benefited 
from the subsidy programme and the allocation to 
districts was based on crop (maize) areas under cultivation. 
Thirdly, the processes of identification of households 
have changed over time. In 2005/06 through to 2007/08, 
local leaders and local level Village Development 
Committees (VDC) were responsible for identifying 
beneficiaries, but agricultural staff managed the 
distribution of coupons in 2007/08 season. In 2008/09 
season, an open system of identification of beneficiaries 
(community-based targeting) using the farming 
households register was introduced in allocation and 
distribution of coupons while the disbursement of 
coupons were led by the Ministry of Agriculture staff. 
There was greater involvement of other stakeholders in 
the facilitation of these processes including Ministry of 
Agriculture staff, religious leaders, VDC members, local 
government, police and civil society representatives.
    Table 2 shows the extent to which open meetings were 
used in coupon allocation and distribution in the 2008/09 
agricultural season across regions. It is evident that the 
open meeting system was used widely in both the 
allocation and distribution of fertilizer subsidy coupons. 
About 81 percent and 96 percent of the households in 
the sample confirmed that open meetings in allocation 
and distribution of fertilizer subsidy coupons were held 
in their communities. The processes were therefore more 
open, particularly the distribution of fertilizer coupons. 
Dorward et al. (2010) note that due to the large number 
of eligible households relative to the number of coupons 
allocated to the villages, there was an informal system 
of re-distribution of coupons within the villages after 
the open meeting, with about 43 percent of the sample 
confirming that re-distribution took place in the 
villages.
Targeting is one of the critical elements of the 
effectiveness of the subsidy and in achieving efficiency 
in resource use. In an economy where the private 
marketing system in input markets is functioning, it is 
important to ensure that the subsidy does not displace 
commercial sales of fertilizers. In other words, the 
subsidized fertilizers should be targeted at households 
that could not have bought fertilizers at the prevailing 
market prices. Hence, the efficiency of a targeted 
programme depends on the extent to which errors of 
inclusion and exclusion can be minimized in the selection 
of beneficiaries.
   According to Coady et al. (2002) errors of inclusion 
(leakage) occur when the non-poor or unintended 
households are included in the programme while errors 
of exclusion (undercoverage) occur when the poor or 
intended households are not included in the programme4. 
The problems of targeting social programmes are well-
documented in the literature and include lack of 
information, high costs of acquiring information, and 
social stigma. The literature describes a number of 
alternative targeting methods in social programmes 
including using individual/household assessments based 
on socio-economic data, categorical targeting, self-
selection and community-based targeting. These 
different methods have their own advantages and 
shortcomings (Morley and Coady 2003). Although more 
recently community-based targeting has been advocated 
as a participatory approach to identification of 
beneficiaries, as Morley and Coady (2003) note there is 
Table 3 Mean Attributes of Households by Number of Fertilizer Subsidy Coupons Received, 2008/9
Fertiliser Coupon numbers per hh Sig.
*
**
*
*
*
**
*
Zero 0.5 to 1 1.5 to 2 More 
than 2
All
% hhold female headed
Owned Area in ha
Value durable assets (MK)
Value durable assets (MK)
Total Value livestock & durable assets  (MK)
Subjective score of hh food consumption over past 
12 months
Subjective score on welfare
Month after harvest that maize ran out
26%
1.16
19,621
18,689
38,150
1.5
2.3
7.2
31%
1.09
15,630
22,947
38,098
1.5
2.2
7.1
24%
1.48
20,340
41,807
61,590
1.6
2.5
7.9
17%
2.17
28,111
58,946
87,058
1.7
2.8
8.6
27%
1.27
18,702
28,699
47,025
1.5
2.3
7.4
 Source: Dorward et al. (2010) Notes: *= one or more differences significant at p=0.05, ** = one or more differences 
significant at 0.01
Table 2. Extent of Use of Open Meeting in 
Allocation and Distribution of Fertilizer 
Subsidy 2008/09
Region Allocation (% 
of sample)
Distribution (% 
of sample)
North 88 99
Central 71 97
South 88 95
Total 81 97
Source: Dorward et al. (2010)
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a danger of elite capture and variable interpretation of 
the programme beneficiary identification criteria. 
Dorward et al. (2010) and Chinsinga (2009), in the context 
of the input subsidy programme, note that the criteria 
for beneficiary identification remain wide and subject 
to different interpretations and communities tend to 
emphasise different vulnerable groups. Similarly, the 
20-40 percent displacements of commercial fertilizer in 
the 2006/07 programme also suggest that households 
that could afford fertilizers at prevailing market prices 
were erroneously included in the programme (SOAS et 
al 2008).
   Table 3 shows the characteristics of rural households 
by the number of coupons for subsidized fertilizer. 
Although since 2006/7, targeting criteria have placed 
more explicit emphasis on the provision of coupons to 
more vulnerable households, the evidence point to the 
fact that the poor and vulnerable groups are generally 
marginalized. The number of coupons received per 
household increases with land size, wealth (represented 
by value of assets and livestock), welfare and food 
security. The proportion of female-headed households 
decreases with the number of coupons received per 
household.
    The difficulties in targeting vulnerable households 
arise from applying the prescribed targeting criteria. 
Dorward et al. (2010) note that fundamental difficulties 
in targeting therefore arise because of ambiguities, 
tensions and contradictions among different targeting 
criteria, related to difficulties in clearly establishing 
measures for applying these criteria, both of these being 
related to large numbers of households apparently 
deserving of coupons relative to the number of coupons 
available. As a result there are many variations in the 
characteristics of beneficiaries of fertilizer subsidy 
coupons, and the better off households tend to dominate 
the vulnerable households.
3. Econometric Model and 
Data
3.1 Model Specification and Data
Our econometric specification of the determinants of 
access to subsidized fertilizers uses two definitions of 
access. The first is receipt of fertilizer5 coupons whether 
the household uses it or not to purchase subsidized 
fertilizers.  SOAS et al (2008) estimated a similar model, 
however, their model focuses on access to subsidized 
fertilizers – those households that actually used their 
coupon allocations to purchase fertilizers. The second 
definition incorporates use of the coupons and measures 
access in terms of the amount of subsidized fertilizers 
acquired by the household (SOAS et al. 2008). We test 
the alternative definitions of access using the following 
empirical model: 6
 
  
 where for household i, ASF is access to or acquisition 
of subsidized fertilizers, HC is a vector of household 
characteristics including household composition and 
assets, FC is a vector of farming characteristics such as 
land sizes and commercial farming, POV is a vector of 
poverty and vulnerability variables, X is a vector of other 
control variables and ε is the error term. Access to 
subsidized fertilizer coupons is specified as a dichotomous 
variable representing receipt of fertilizer coupons, 
equation (1) is estimated using the probit model. 
Alternatively, where we use quantity of subsidized 
fertilizers acquired we estimate equation (1) using a tobit 
model.
We use data from the 2007/08 and 2008/09 evaluation 
of the MAISP collected from rural households drawn from 
all livelihood zones in the country, covering 14 of the 29 
districts. The data contains information from 1,982 
households. Most of the households are drawn from a 
panel of households sampled in the 2004/05 Integrated 
Household Survey, with the rest being replacement 
households. Although the agricultural input subsidy 
programme also covers maize and legume seeds and 
cotton chemicals, the analysis focuses on the fertilizer 
subsidy which is the largest component of the programme. 
The data captured information for both 2007/08 and 
2008/09 seasons, and we explain access to 2008/09 
subsidized fertilizers using 2007/08 characteristics 
representing an environment prior to the receipt of the 
subsidy in the reference agricultural season.
3.2 Definition of Variables
    The dependent variables in the model are access to 
fertilizer coupons and quantity of subsidized fertilizers 
acquired by the household. Access to fertilizer coupons 
is defined as a dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one 
member of the household received a fertilizer voucher 
or coupon in the 2008/09 agricultural season. The 
quantity of subsidized fertilizers is the total amount of 
fertilizers in kilograms the household obtained using 
fertilizer coupons in the 2008/09 agricultural season. The 
acquisition of subsidized fertilizers using coupons implies 
use of the coupon to purchase fertilizers, although the 
farmer may not use all of the fertilizers in a particular 
season.
We group the explanatory variables into household 
characteristics, farmer characteristics, poverty and 
vulnerability variables and other control variables. The 
household characteristics in our model include age of 
household head, sex of household head, elderly headed 
households, household size, number of economically 
active members of the household and value of durable 
assets. The age of the household head is measured as 
number of years while the sex of the household head is 
represented by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
household head is male, otherwise equal to zero. Our 
hypothesis is that since female-headed households are 
singled out as one of the vulnerable groups in the criteria 
for targeting, we expect that female-headed households 
are more likely to access subsidized fertilizers. We also 
include elderly-headed households as one of the 
(1)
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vulnerable groups; defined as a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if the household head is above 65 years of age. 
Household size in terms of number of adult equivalents 
or the number of economically active members is 
included in the model to capture the effects of availability 
of family labour, which is important for agricultural 
activities in rural Malawi. The value of durable assets in 
2008/09, measured in US dollars, represents the resource 
base, hence the wealth of the household. Since this 
indicates affordability, our expectation is that wealthier 
households are likely to redeem their fertilizer coupons, 
and are likely to be given priority on account of likely 
utilization of the subsidy. However, being resource-poor, 
low values of assets is the main criterion for identification 
of households and we therefore expect a negative 
relationship between wealth and access to subsidized 
fertilizers.
Farm characteristics variables include cultivated land 
in the 2008/09 season, cultivation of burley tobacco, 
selling maize in 2008/09 season, selling agricultural 
produce and acquisition of commercial fertilizers in 
2007/08 season. Land cultivated in 2008/09 agricultural 
season is measured in hectares. Ownership of land is one 
of the main criteria for allocation of subsidy coupons in 
combination with resource constraints. Our expectation 
is that households with more land are more likely to have 
access to coupons compared to households with no land 
or small land sizes. Since 2005/06 season until the 2008/09 
season, the fertilizer subsidy has also been covering 
smallholder burley tobacco growers. Ideally, cultivation 
of a cash crop should enable farmers to procure 
commercial fertilizers for both cash and food crop 
production, and access to subsidized fertilizers may 
potentially crowd-out commercial fertilizer sales. SOAS 
et al. (2008) find that displacement of commercial sales 
of fertilizers tends to be higher among tobacco farmers 
than among maize farmers. Marketing of maize by the 
household in 2008/09 is captured by a dummy equal to 
1 if the household sold some maize. Households that 
sell maize are potentially net maize sellers and therefore 
food secure. We also test the role of commercial 
orientation of farmers, represented by participation in 
produce markets defined as a dummy variable equal to 
1 if the household sold any agricultural output in 2008/09 
season. Farmers that can afford purchase of fertilizers at 
prevailing market prices are unlikely to access subsidized 
fertilizers. To capture this aspect we include the quantity 
of commercial fertilizers acquired by the household in 
the previous season (2007/08). The higher the quantity 
of commercial fertilizer purchased the less resource-
constrained the farmer and the more likely to be excluded 
in the allocation of the subsidy.
More recently, the targeting guidelines have 
emphasized recognition of vulnerable households. In 
this regard, our specification includes a vector of poverty 
and vulnerability variables which include self-assessed 
poverty status in the previous season, food consumption 
adequacy following the previous season’s harvest, and 
participation in social safety net programmes. The first 
indicator of poverty and vulnerability is the own 
assessment of poverty in 2007/08 prior to receipt of 
fertilizer coupons. This is represented by a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the household classified itself as 
poor in 2007.7  It is expected that those households that 
reveal that they are poor are more likely to have access 
to subsidized inputs. The second indicator of vulnerability 
is the food security situation of the households. We 
represent this using a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
household revealed that it had adequate or more than 
adequate food consumption in the past year of the survey 
(hence following the 2007/08 harvest). Since the 
programme objective is to achieve self-sufficiency in 
food, ceteris paribus, food insecure households are 
expected to have access to subsidized fertilizers. 
Participation in other social safety nets rather than input 
subsidies should also indicate vulnerability of households. 
Participation in other social safety net programmes is 
represented by a dummy variable equal to 1 if any 
member of the household participated in other social 
safety net programmes, otherwise equal to zero.8 
Alternatively, we include participation in public works 
programmes in which a dummy equal to 1 represents 
participation in public works programmes. Participation 
in other social safety nets may also be a potential factor 
in exclusion of vulnerable groups as the communities or 
implementers may feel that such households are already 
benefiting from social assistance.
We also introduce control variables in the model which 
include household’s participation in the labour market, 
ownership of a business enterprise, receipt of remittances, 
receipt of subsidy coupons in the previous season 
(2007/08), coupon allocation system and regional 
dummies. Employment, business enterprise and 
remittances are indicators of household affordability of 
commercial fertilizers or ability to redeem vouchers. 
Participation in the labour market is represented by a 
dummy which is equal to 1 if any member of the 
household received income from salaried or ganyu 
employment in the previous season. Households that 
operate business enterprise, represented by a dummy 
equal to 1 if any member of the household operated a 
business enterprise in the 2007/08 season, are more likely 
to afford fertilizers at market prices. Similarly, receipt of 
remittances, represented by a dummy equal to 1, 
improves household ability to purchase commercial 
fertilizers. We include a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
household received subsidy coupons in the previous 
agricultural season, 2007/08. Since 2007/08, the 
government introduced the system of registering farm 
households and an open forum for identification of 
beneficiaries and allocation of coupons to improve 
transparency and accountability. Previously, local 
politicians, traditional leaders and village committees 
were responsible for allocating coupons; a process which 
many farmers claimed was characterized by biases and 
favouritism (SOAS et al. 2008). The effect of the method 
of coupon allocation is captured by a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if poor households revealed that an open 
system of allocating coupons was used in their community. 
We expect that a more open and transparent system of 
coupon allocation is likely to favour the poor, hence a 
positive relationship between access and open forum 
and poverty.
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4. Results and Discussions
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
   
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics of the variables 
used in the econometric analysis. The data show that 
about 70 percent of the sample households received a 
subsidized fertilizer coupon in the 2008/09 agricultural 
season. On average, households procured 53.6 kilograms 
of subsidized fertilizers using the voucher. The sample 
is also dominated by male-headed households 
accounting for 74 percent. We also note that about 16 
percent of households are headed by the elderly. The 
sample is mainly rural and most of the households belong 
to the smallholder category as manifested by ownership 
of 1 hectare of land under cultivation in the 2008/09 
agricultural season. Only 16 percent of households 
cultivated tobacco and only 33 percent were engaged 
in crop marketing following the 2008/09 harvest. The 
fertilizer subsidy focuses on maize that is produced to 
meet subsistence needs – the low proportion of 
households that engage in the sale of maize, only 10 
percent, reflect the subsistence nature of maize. In 
2007/08 season, only 28 percent of households purchased 
fertilizers at prevailing market prices, but this increased 
to 40 percent in the 2008/09 season. The prices of 
fertilizers in early 2007 increased substantially at the 
international market and consequently raised the 
domestic price of fertilizers in the 2007/08 agricultural 
season. Prices of fertilizers fell prior to the 2008/09 
agricultural season, and it is not therefore surprising that 
there has been a 12 percent increase in the proportion 
of rural farmers that acquired commercial fertilizers. On 
average households purchased 43 kilograms of 
commercial fertilizers in 2007/08, but the amount of 
commercial fertilizer purchased in 2008/09 season only 
increased to 48 kilograms. 
Most of the households ranked themselves as poor 
(87 percent) the 2007/08, but the proportion decreased 
to only 83 percent in the 2008/09 season. The self-
assessment of poverty may be biased downwards given 
households’ knowledge about the criteria for accessing 
the subsidy. However, using some indicator of food 
security, about 46 percent of households had adequate 
or more than adequate food consumption following the 
2007/08 harvest, which implies that food poverty was 
about 54 percent. Only 15 percent of the households 
had access to social safety nets in 2007/08 (this increased 
to 17 percent in 2008/09). In 2007/08, 59 percent of the 
households had access to fertilizer coupons. We also note 
that a significant proportion of households participated 
in the labour market, operated a business enterprise and/
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics
Variables Mean SD Min Max
Access to fertilizer coupons in 2008/9 (0/1) 0.699 0.459 0.00 1.00
Quantity of subsidized fertilizers acquired 2008/9 (KG) 53.589 49.910 0.00 600.0
Age of household head (years) 47.133 16.063 18.00 99.00
Male headed household (0/1) 0.736 0.441 0.00 1.00
Elderly headed household (0/1) 0.155 0.362 0.00 1.00
Household size (adult equivalents) 4.714 2.109 0.00 16.98
Value of assets in US dollars in 2008/9 165.22 632.76 0.00 18064
Cultivated land in hectares in 2008/9 0.978 0.722 0.00 6.88
Tobacco cultivation in 2008/9 (0/1) 0.156 0.363 0.00 1.00
Crop marketing in 2008/9 (0/1) 0.330 0.471 0.00 1.00
Maize marketing in 2008/9 (0/1) 0.101 0.302 0.00 1.00
Quantity of commercial fertilizers bought in 2007/8 
(KG) 43.02 230.43 0.00 6700
Own poverty assessment as poor in 2007/8 (0/1) 0.865 0.342 0.00 1.00
Adequate food consumption in 2008/9 (0/1) 0.462 0.499 0.00 1.00
Business enterprise in 2007/8 (0/1) 0.395 0.489 0.00 1.00
Labour market participation in 2007/8 (0/1) 0.497 0.500 0.00 1.00
Remittance receipts in 2007/8 0.392 0.488 0.00 1.00
Access to social safety nets in 2007/8 (0/1) 0.147 0.354 0.00 1.00
Access to fertilizer coupons in 2007/8 (0/1) 0.593 0.491 0.00 1.00
Open forum allocations 2008/9 and poor 2007/8 (0/1) 0.709 0.454 0.00 1.00
Northern region (0/1) 0.192 0.394 0.00 1.00
Central region (0/1) 0.363 0.481 0.00 1.00
Southern region (0/1) 0.446 0.497 0.00 1.00
Notes:  (0/1) indicates dichotomous variable equal to 1 for the included category, otherwise equal to 0 for the base 
category.
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or had received remittances in 2007/08, a season prior 
to receiving the fertilizer coupons for the 2008/09 
season.
4.2 Econometric Results
Table 5 presents probit regression estimates of factors 
that determined access to subsidized fertilizer coupons 
in the 2008/09 agricultural season. We report the marginal 
effects of these factors on the probability of receiving a 
fertilizer subsidy coupon. Model 1 includes dummies for 
cultivation of burley tobacco and marketing of maize in 
the 2008/09 season and excludes the dummy for general 
agricultural produce marketing. Model 2 excludes 
tobacco cultivation and maize marketing, instead 
includes general crop marketing. The models explain 
about 26–27 percent of the variations as indicated by 
the Pseudo R2. The Wald X2 statistic shows that we reject 
the hypotheses that the marginal effects are equal to 
zero at the 1 percent significance level.
The household characteristics that are significant in 
explaining household’s receipt of subsidized fertilizer 
coupons in both model specifications are age of house-
hold head, elderly headed households. With respect to 
age of household head, as the age of household heads 
increases such households are more likely to receive 
coupons and the probability of getting a coupon 
increases by 0.3 percent. However, households that are 
headed by the elderly (those above 64 years) are unlikely 
to receive fertilizer coupons and the probability falls by 
13 percent. This is contrary to the emphasis on special 
vulnerable groups that has been placed recently in the 
targeting criteria for the subsidy programme. It may also 
be the case that elderly headed households are labour-
constrained for farming activities and are least likely to 
use the coupons in farming.
All the variables representing farming characteristics 
are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. First, we 
find a positive relationship between probability of 
receiving a fertilizer coupon and size of land under 
Table 5 Probit Estimates for Access to Fertilizer Coupons in 2008/09
Variables Model 1 Model 2
dF/dx z dF/dx z
Age of household head (years) 0.0032 3.11a 0.0027 2.54b
Male headed household (0/1)* 0.0021 0.08 -0.0032 -0.13
Elderly headed household (0/1)* -0.1304 -2.75a -0.1226 -2.44b
Household size (adult equivalents) -0.0113 -2.02b -0.0075 -0.89
Value of assets in US dollars in 2008/9 0.00001 -0.67 0.00001 -0.88
Cultivated land in hectares in 2008/9 0.0561 3.03a 0.0624 3.36a
Tobacco cultivation in 2008/9 (0/1)* 0.1720 5.29a – –
Maize marketing in 2008/9 (0/1)* 0.1126 3.22a – –
Crop marketing in 2008/9 (0/1)* – – 0.1011 4.27a
Quantity of commercial fertilizers bought in 2007/8 
(KG) -0.0002 -2.50b -0.0001 -2.39b
Own poverty assessment as poor in 2007/8 (0/1)* -0.0802 -2.19b -0.0706 -1.88c
Adequate food consumption in 2008/9 (0/1)* 0.0202 0.91 0.0221 0.99
Business enterprise in 2007/8 (0/1)* 0.0051 0.23 0.0006 0.03
Labour market participation in 2007/8 (0/1)* -0.0411 -1.83c -0.0490 -2.17b
Remittance receipts in 2007/8 (0/1)* 0.0747 3.26a 0.0741 3.23a
Access to social safety nets in 2007/8 (0/1)* 0.0704 2.36b 0.0792 2.67a
Access to fertilizer coupons in 2007/8 (0/1)* 0.4460 20.21a 0.4515 20.46a
Open forum allocations 2008/9 and poor 2007/8 (0/1)* 0.0981 3.39a 0.0854 2.92a
Central region (0/1)* -0.0367 -1.11 -0.0520 -1.55
Southern region (0/1)* -0.0321 -0.99 -0.0432 -1.35
Number of observations 1982 1982
Wald chi-squared (18) 517.51 518.39
Prob > chi-squared 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R-squared 0.2703 0.2582
Notes:  The dependent variable is a dummy variable for access to subsidized fertilizer coupons received in the 
2008/09 agricultural season. (*) dF/dx (marginal effect) is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Robust 
t-statistics with superscripts a, b and c denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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cultivation in both models. The results show that a unit 
increase in land increases the probability of receiving a 
coupon by 6 percent. The positive relationship is expected 
since land is one of the main criteria for targeting 
smallholder farmers. This finding is similar to the results 
in the 2006/07 study, in which a household with at least 
3 hectares of land was 14 percent more likely to receive 
subsidized fertilizer (SOAS et al. 2008). Secondly, 
cultivation of tobacco, maize marketing and general 
produce marketing all increase the probability of 
receiving fertilizer coupons. Being a smallholder tobacco 
farmer increases the probability of receiving a fertilizer 
coupon by as much as 17 percent while those that 
produce a marketable maize surplus increase the 
probability of receiving the fertilizer coupons by 11 
percent. Similarly, farmers that engage in commercial 
agriculture – those that sold some crops – are more likely 
to receive fertilizer coupons and increase the probability 
of receiving coupons by 10 percent. This implies that 
fertilizer coupons are likely to go to those smallholder 
farmers that earn cash incomes from agriculture with 
the potential to purchase fertilizers at prevailing market 
prices. Thirdly, we find that households that bought 
commercial fertilizers in the previous season are less likely 
to be allocated subsidized fertilizer coupons, and 
purchase of commercial fertilizers leads to a marginal 
0.02 percent reduction in the probability. However, the 
marginal effect shows that the targeting is not good at 
excluding those who can afford commercial 
purchases.
Among the two poverty indicators, only the marginal 
effects of own assessment of poverty in 2007/08 is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level in model 1 
and 10 percent level of significance in model 2. The 
negative relationship between poverty and receipt of 
coupons shows that households that view themselves 
as poor are less likely to receive coupons. Poverty reduces 
the probability of receiving coupons by 8 percent. In the 
first two years of the subsidy, evidence of cash for coupon 
redemption was a pre-condition in some communities 
for households to receive fertilizer coupons (ICL et al. 
2007 and SOAS et al. 2008). SOAS et al. (2008) find similar 
results on the effect of own poverty evaluation on the 
likelihood of receiving fertilizers, with wealthier 
households receiving more coupons than the poor 
households.
Four of the seven other control variables are important 
determinant of access to fertilizer vouchers. First, we find 
that participation in the labour market either through 
salaried or ganyu employment in the 2007/08 season 
reduced the household’s chances of receiving coupons 
in the 2008/09 season.9 The marginal effects of labour 
market participation are statistically significant at 10 
percent and 5 percent level in model 1 and 2, respectively. 
Labour market participation in the previous season 
reduces the probability of receiving fertilizer coupons 
by about 5 percent. This implies that those in salaried 
employment are excluded as they are capable of 
purchasing fertilizers at commercial prices and those in 
ganyu employment maybe those households that do 
not have adequate land and use their labour resource 
in ganyu labour. Nonetheless, ganyu labour is the second 
most important source of cash for redeeming the 
coupons (SOAS et al. 2008 and Dorward et al. 2010). 
Secondly, there is a statistically significant positive 
relationship between remittances and probability of 
receiving coupons. Receipt of remittances in the previous 
season increases the probability of receiving coupons 
by 7.4 percent. Remittances are one of the sources of 
cash for redemption of coupons and purchase of farm 
inputs in the rural areas.
Thirdly, we find access to other social safety nets in 
the previous season to be positively associated with 
receipt of fertilizer coupons in the 2008/09 season. 
Participation in safety nets increases the probability of 
receipt of coupons by about 8 percent. This implies that 
participants in other social safety nets are not excluded 
from the fertilizer vouchers, and if safety nets are well 
targeted then they provide additional information about 
the vulnerable households in the communities. Some 
of the social safety nets such as cash-for-work or public 
works programmes if well coordinated can ease the cash 
constraint of vulnerable households and enable them 
to redeem the fertilizer coupons. Fourthly, the results 
suggest that households that benefited from the subsidy 
in the previous season were more likely to receive the 
coupons in the next season. The probability of receiving 
fertilizer coupons increases by 45 percent for households 
targeted in the previous season. Finally, it is interesting 
to note how important open forums for allocating 
coupons are for poor households. Dorward et al. (2010) 
and Chinsinga (2009) note that open meetings were used 
widely in allocation and distribution of coupons in the 
2008/09 programme, particularly in the base allocation. 
Open forums for allocating coupons increase the chance 
of targeting those that ranked themselves in the poor 
category by about 10 percent. This suggests that 
community-based targeting may be superior to 
allocations that involve traditional leaders and 
committees as was previously the case in the 2005/06 
up to the 2007/08 season.
We present tobit regression estimates of the factors 
associated with the quantity of subsidized fertilizers 
acquired by the households in 2008/09 season in Table 
6. Although the explanatory power is low, the F-statistics 
suggest that we reject the null hypothesis that all the 
parameter estimates are equal to zero. In this model, 
household characteristics perform poorly, with only age 
of the household head being statistically significant at 
the 10 percent level in Model 1. In terms of farming 
characteristics, we find evidence of the positive 
relationship between quantity of subsidized fertilizers 
and land size, tobacco cultivation, maize marketing and 
general crop marketing, but no evidence of a significant 
relationship between subsidized fertilizers and 
commercial fertilizers. The coefficient of cultivated land 
is statistically significant at the 1 percent level in both 
models. A unit increase in hectares increases acquisition 
of subsidized fertilizers by about 13 kilograms. The 
coefficient of tobacco cultivation is also statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level, and cultivation of 
tobacco raises the amount of subsidized fertilizers by 28 
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kilograms. This implies that on average tobacco farmers 
received more fertilizers than non-tobacco farmers. 
Although the policy is one package per household, it 
appears that tobacco farmers may also have received 
subsidized fertilizers for maize. Similar to the probit 
results, households that sold some maize or those that 
participated in general agricultural produce marketing 
tended to have acquired more subsidized fertilizers, with 
the coefficients being statistically significant at the 1 
percent level. We find no statistically significant 
relationship between quantity of commercial fertilizers 
and the amount of subsidized fertilizers, suggesting that 
the programme also targets households that can afford 
commercial fertilizers leading to displacement of 
commercial sales.
There is a significant negative relationship between 
poverty and the quantity of subsidized fertilizers received 
by the households. Households that rank themselves in 
the poor category are likely to receive about 15 kilograms 
less than households in the non-poor category. There is 
a tendency for the subsidized fertilizers to reach the 
better-off farmers. This result is reinforced by the 
significant positive relationship between adequacy in 
food consumption and amount of subsidized fertilizers. 
Households that are food secure tend to receive 7 
kilograms more subsidized fertilizers than food insecure 
households.
The coefficient of participation in the labour market 
is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level in both models. The results show that households 
that had some employment received about 9 kilograms 
less of subsidized fertilizers than households that did 
not participate in the labour market. Hence, the targeting 
generally tends to exclude those that are wage earners. 
Remittances and business enterprise do not seem to 
influence the amount of subsidized fertilizers received 
by the household, while access to social safety nets 
weakly influences the amount of subsidized fertilizers. 
The impact of access to subsidized fertilizer in the 
previous season on the amount of subsidized fertilizer 
Table 6 Tobit Estimates for Access to Subsidized Fertilizers in 2008/09
Variables Model 1 Model 2
coeff. z coeff. z
Age of household head (years) 0.227 1.69c 0.118 0.84
Male headed household (0/1) 1.698 0.49 0.921 0.26
Elderly headed household (0/1) -7.940 -1.49 -4.926 -0.85
Household size (adult equivalents) -1.172 -1.62 0.165 0.16
Value of assets in US dollars in 2008/9 -0.004 -1.09 -0.004 -1.29
Cultivated land in hectares in 2008/9 12.947 4.75a 13.679 5.15a
Tobacco cultivation in 2008/9 (0/1) 27.639 7.21
a – –
Maize marketing in 2008/9 (0/1) 15.934 3.22a – –
Crop marketing in 2008/9 (0/1) – – 17.277 5.45a
Quantity of commercial fertilizers bought in 2007/8 
(KG) -0.014 -1.28 -0.010 -1.00
Own poverty assessment as poor in 2007/8 (0/1) -15.299 -2.62a -13.819 -2.37b
Adequate food consumption in 2008/9 (0/1) 6.501 2.23b 6.179 2.10b
Business enterprise in 2007/8 (0/1) 0.432 0.15 -0.389 -0.13
Labour market participation in 2007/8 (0/1) -8.217 -2.85a -9.297 -3.20a
Remittance receipts in 2007/8 (0/1) 5.049 1.63 4.486 1.44
Access to social safety nets in 2007/8 (0/1) 4.666 1.40 5.906 1.79c
Access to fertilizer coupons in 2007/8 (0/1) 56.109 15.82a 57.306 16.19c
Open forum allocations 2008/9 and poor 2007/8 (0/1) 13.167 3.36a 11.489 2.89a
Central region (0/1) -24.973 -6.35a -28.354 -6.97a
Southern region (0/1) -18.023 -4.51a -20.761 -5.20a
Constant 3.257 0.35 4.675 0.50
Number of observations 1982 1982
F (18, 1963) 27 26.3
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R-squared 0.0406 0.0388
Notes:  The dependent variable is quantity of subsidized fertilizer acquired in the 2008/09 agricultural season. 
Robust t-statistics with superscripts a, b and c denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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in the 2008/09 season is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level in both models. Households that are 
successively receiving subsidized fertilizers receive 56 
kilograms (just more than a 50 kg bag) more that 
households that only received fertilizers in the 2008/09 
season. Transparency in coupon allocation also tends to 
favour the poor with the coefficient of the interaction of 
open forum and poverty being positive and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. We also find that the 
central and southern regions also tend to receive about 
28 kilograms and 20 kilograms per household less than 
the northern region.
5. Conclusions
The paper set out to investigate factors that facilitate 
access to subsidized fertilizer coupons in Malawi. Since 
2005/06 season, the Malawi Government has been 
implementing an agricultural input subsidy programme 
targeting smallholder farmers in order to improve 
productivity and food security. As a productivity 
enhancing programme, the input subsidy programme 
also plays a social protection role among the poor and 
vulnerable household by making food accessible and 
available, and directly by targeting vulnerable groups. 
The agricultural input subsidy programme targets 
smallholder farmers who are resource-poor but own a 
piece of land. The targeting criteria also recognizes 
special vulnerable groups as targets such as guardians 
looking after physically challenged persons, child-
headed, female-headed and orphan-headed households 
and households infected or affected with HIV and AIDS. 
There are contradictions in the targeting criteria in 
reaching out to vulnerable groups. Nonetheless, the 
targeting criteria remain wide and there are variations 
in the use of the targeting guidelines in different 
communities particularly since the number of needy 
households tends to be much larger than the available 
number of fertilizer coupons. 
The main focus of the subsidy is on fertilizers for maize 
production and improved maize seed varieties, although 
over the years there has been inclusion of cash crops 
such as tobacco, tea, coffee and cotton. The fertilizer 
subsidy benefited 1.5 million maize farmers and 0.2 
million tobacco farmers in the 2008/09 agricultural 
season; more than half of the estimated number of 
farming households. The fertilizer coupons were allocated 
based on an updated register of farmers, and for most 
households the identification of beneficiary households 
and subsequent allocation of coupons were done in an 
open meeting.
Since the target group for the fertilizer subsidy 
programme includes the poor and vulnerable groups, 
apart from productivity enhancement, the subsidy may 
also provide social protection to vulnerable groups. 
Several findings emerge from the study with implications 
on targeting of the input subsidy programme. First, the 
study finds that although the poor and vulnerable 
households are also allocated subsidized fertilizer 
coupons, they are less likely and receive less than the 
better off smallholder farmers that have larger parcels 
of land and wealthier. Elderly-headed households and 
the poor are less likely to access subsidized fertilizer 
coupons while households with larger parcels of land 
and those that market part of their produce are more 
likely to receive subsidized fertilizer coupons. The 
programme, however, succeeds in excluding households 
that earn incomes from the labour market, particularly 
those that earn income from non-ganyu labour. There is 
a weak relationship between access to coupons and 
quantity of fertilizers from commercial purchases, 
implying that the problems of targeting result in some 
displacement of commercial sales of fertilizers.
Secondly, participation in other social safety nets in 
the past does not exclude households from the input 
subsidy programme. The beneficiaries of other social 
safety nets are more likely to access subsidized fertilizer 
coupons, hence there are complementarities among 
social safety nets. Some of the social safety nets that 
target the poor and vulnerable households, such as cash-
for-work or public works programmes, ease the cash 
constraint of vulnerable households and enable them 
to redeem the fertilizer coupons. In addition, if other 
social safety nets are well targeted at the vulnerable 
groups, it implies that participation in such programmes 
provide additional information on vulnerability in 
targeting the input subsidy programme. Finally, open-
ness in the implementation of the input subsidy 
programme is pro-poor. The introduction of the open 
forums in the allocation of subsidized fertilizer coupons 
tends to raise the likelihood of the poor, who are gener-
ally marginalized, to access subsidized fertilizer coupons 
and to acquire more subsidized fertilizers than when the 
process is not transparent.
The results therefore suggest that for the subsidy 
programme to effectively perform its direct social protec-
tion role there is a need to review the targeting criteria 
so that they recognize the vulnerable groups as the main 
target group provided such households have cultivatable 
land. For instance, using a point system on the existing 
criteria has the potential to increase access to subsidized 
fertilizers to the vulnerable groups. While possession of 
land should be the basic condition for access to fertilizer 
coupons, households should gain additional targeting 
points if they also qualify as vulnerable households as 
defined by the existing criteria. For instance, an elderly 
female-headed household would get two additional 
targeting points while an elderly male-headed house-
hold would only get one additional targeting point. 
Households with land and high targeting points should 
be prioritized in the allocation of coupons using an open 
forum held in the community. Furthermore, there is also 
a need to enhance the complementarity of the input 
subsidy programme and cash-for-work programmes 
through increased coordination, particularly to enable 
vulnerable groups to access cash for the redemption of 
subsidized fertilizer coupons.
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End Notes
 This paper is an output of the Future Agricultures Consortium 
(FAC) in the thematic area of Agricultural Growth and Social 
Protection. The usual disclaimer applies.
†  Professor of Economics, Wadonda Consult, PO Box 669, Zomba, 
Malawi. Email: echirwa@yahoo.com. 
††  Program Analyst, UNDP Lilongwe, Malawi and 
††† Professor of Development Economics, Centre for Development, 
Environment and Policy (CeDEP), School of Oriental and African 
Studies (SOAS), University of London.
1   Dorward et al. (2009) discuss these in the context of post-
Independence agricultural policies in Malawi.
 2      This section draws on Dorward and Chirwa (2009) and Dorward 
et al. (2010).
3    The inclusion of cash crops such as coffee and tea was more 
politically motivated; 2009 being an election year smallholder 
tea and coffee farmers lobbied during the year to benefit from 
the subsidy programme on grounds of the substantial increase 
in the cost of fertilizers (Dorward et al. 2010).
4     These errors are also known as E-mistakes (excessive coverage) 
and F-mistakes (failure to reach intended beneficiaries), 
respectively (Cornia and Stewart 1995). See Coady and Skoufias 
(2001) for alternative interpretations.
5      There are several factors that lead to farmers’ inability to 
redeem the vouchers including lack of money to redeem the 
coupons, unavailability of inputs, availability of inappropriate 
types of fertilizers and late distribution of vouchers particularly 
supplementary allocations (SOAS et al. 2008). However, only 
1.2 percent of households in the sample were unable to 
redeem their fertilizer coupons.
6   The models are similar to those used in SOAS et al. (2008). 
However, the major departure in this paper is that we use 
mostly variables derived from the previous season (2007/07) 
to predict receipt of fertilizer vouchers in the current season 
(2008/09).
7 The self-assessment of poverty involves the households’ 
perception of their own poverty using a six step ladder ranging 
from 1 (very poor) to 6 (very rich). The poor are those with the 
ladder values from 1 to 3.
8    These social safety nets include free food distribution, food 
or cash for work programmes, targeted nutrition programmes, 
supplementary feeding programmes and direct cash transfers 
implemented by government and non-governmental 
organisations.
9   We also estimated the models with ganyu employment in 
2007/08 instead of participation in the labour market in 
general. Although, the marginal effect remained negative, the 
coefficient was statistically insignificant. This suggests that 
the labour market participation and access to subsidy coupons 
is more driven by non-ganyu labour participation.
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